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LIEN ON ME: THE SURVIVAL OF SECURITY 
INTERESTS IN REVENUES FROM THE SALE 
OF AN FCC LICENSE 
Abstract: A debtor can give a security interest in collateral only when, 
among other things, the debtor has rights in that collateral. This rule 
becomes complicated when a holder of a Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) license wishes to grant a security interest in the pro-
ceeds it may receive from selling that license in the future. The question 
of when an FCC licensee acquires the right to receive revenues from the 
sale of its license is a controversial one, due to the fact that any sale of 
an FCC license cannot occur until there is (1) a contract for sale and 
(2) approval from the FCC. The existence of contingencies in future 
rights to payment, however, is not a new phenomenon. In several indus-
tries, acquisition of the item from which the right to payment stems 
triggers this right—-in the FCC context, this right arises upon acquisi-
tion of the FCC license itself. This Note argues that, given the similari-
ties between the FCC licensing scheme and these other industries, and 
the presence of only inconsequential differences, there is no reason to 
treat FCC licensing differently. As such, the right to receive revenues 
from the sale of an FCC license should be found to exist upon acquisi-
tion of the FCC license, and should not depend on whether the two 
contingencies required for sale have occurred. 
Introduction 
 The telecommunications industry is responsible for transmission of 
a large portion of information between parties in the United States.1 
Given the importance of communication and the reliance on technol-
ogy in today’s society, the telecommunications industry is a vital compo-
nent of the world’s economy.2 Although information can be transmitted 
through wires and cables, a significant amount of telecommunications 
                                                                                                                      
1 What We Do, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
2 See Press Release, Research and Markets, Telecom Sector in United States—Trends 
and Opportunities (2011–2015) Is Essential Reading for Those Operating in the Telecoms 
Field (Aug. 11, 2011), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/2011081100 
6356/en/Research-Markets-Telecom-Sector-United-States. 
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services are offered wirelessly over a spectrum of radio frequencies (the 
“spectrum”).3 
 Like all businesses, entities within the telecommunications indus-
try often need substantial financing to operate.4 The high cost of Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) licenses makes this particu-
larly true for entities looking to enter the telecommunications market.5 
Potential entrants must have a license to operate on the spectrum, but 
few have the capital needed to place a successful bid at auction.6 Any 
lender willing to finance a telecommunications provider will require 
the provider to offer collateral to secure the loan and ensure repay-
ment.7 Often, creditors seek the debtor’s right to receive proceeds 
from the future sale of the debtor’s FCC license (“sale revenues”) as 
collateral.8 
                                                                                                                     
 The enforceability implications of this security interest are unclear, 
however, when the sale of the license occurs after a provider has filed 
bankruptcy.9 For a security interest in an item to survive bankruptcy, 
the item must have been subject to a valid pre-petition security interest, 
or be proceeds of collateral that was subject to a valid pre-petition secu-
rity interest.10 A valid security interest is created when the interest at-
 
3 See Press Release, supra note 2. These services include broadcast television, broad-
band internet, and cellular phones. See Stuart Minor Benjamin et al., Telecommunica-
tions Law and Policy 12 (2d ed. 2006). 
4 Stephen L. Sepinuck, Collateralizing the Economic Value of Broadcast Licenses, Transac-
tional Lawyer, Oct. 2011, at 5, 6. 
5 See id.; Frank Montero, Security Interests in FCC Licenses: A Key to Unlocking Capital Sources?, 
CommLawBlog (Nov. 7, 2008), http://www.commlawblog.com/2008/11/articles/broadcast/ 
security-interests-in-fcc-licenses-a-key-to-unlocking-capital-sources. 
6 See Sepinuck, supra note 4, at 6; Montero, supra note 5. 
7 See William L. Fishman, Property Rights, Reliance, and Retroactivity Under the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, 50 Fed. Comm. L.J. 1, 16–17 (1997). 
8 See id. at 17. 
9 See In re TerreStar Networks, Inc., 457 B.R. 254, 269 & n.13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re 
Tracy Broad. Corp., 438 B.R. 323, 330 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2010), aff’d, 469 B.R. 55 (D. Colo. 
2011), overruled by 2012 WL 4874485 (10th Cir. 2012). 
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). “Pre-petition” refers to the period of time before one files 
for bankruptcy and commences the bankruptcy case; “post-petition” refers to the period of 
time after commencement. See Raymond T. Nimmer et al., Commercial Transactions: 
Secured Financing Cases, Materials, Problems 74, 253 (3d ed. 2003) To be subject to a 
valid pre-petition security interest, the debtor must have had rights in the collateral before 
commencement of the bankruptcy case. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (2003). A sale of an FCC li-
cense usually occurs during the bankruptcy case; thus, a security interest in sale revenues that 
does not survive bankruptcy is essentially worthless. See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269 n.13; 
David Oxenford, Securing a Loan to a Broadcaster, Part 2—Bankruptcy Cases and Liens on Licenses, 
Broadcast L. Blog (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2011/09/articles/ 
assignments-and-transfers/securing-a-loan-to-a-broadcaster-part- 2-bankruptcy-cases-and-liens-
on-licenses/. 
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taches; thus, for a security interest to survive bankruptcy, all require-
ments for attachment must be satisfied pre-petition.11 A sale of an FCC 
license cannot occur until two conditions are met.12 This raises an im-
portant question: if neither of the two conditions of sale have been sat-
isfied by the time the debtor files for bankruptcy, does the debtor have 
“rights in the collateral” such that the security interest attaches?13 The 
question has created a controversy; some believe that a debtor has 
rights as soon as the debtor acquires the license, whereas others state 
that the debtor cannot have rights when neither condition of sale has 
occurred because the sale of the license is not adequately forthcom-
ing.14 
 This Note analyzes the current dispute over the question of when a 
debtor acquires the right to receive revenues from the sale of its FCC 
license, argues that the debtor’s right comes into existence at the time 
it acquires the license, and goes beyond the traditional policy argument 
that courts have relied on to provide a legal basis for that conclusion.15 
Part I provides an overview of the process through which creditors ob-
tain a security interest in sale revenues of an FCC license, as well as the 
bankruptcy implications of such a lien.16 Part II highlights the debate 
regarding when the debtor acquires the right to receive sale revenues 
by discussing the outcomes of In re TerreStar Networks, Inc. and In re Tracy 
Broadcasting Corp.17 Part III outlines three situations outside the tele-
communications context in which a debtor’s right to receive future 
                                                                                                                      
11 See U.C.C. § 9-203(a); Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 115. One of the require-
ments for attachment is that the debtor have “rights in the collateral.” U.C.C. § 9-203(b). 
12 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *6 (explaining that there must be a contract for 
sale, as well as FCC approval, before the license may be sold to a third party); In re Ter-
reStar, 457 B.R. at 269; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. 
13 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330; supra note 4, at 5. 
14 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *6, *13 (holding that a security interest in a 
debtor’s right to receive sale revenues must attach pre-petition; otherwise, such security 
interests would be of little value and would prevent entities in the telecommunications 
industry from obtaining loans); In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269 (holding that a debtor’s 
right to receive sale revenues from the debtor’s FCC license exists pre-petition, even 
though neither condition of sale has yet occurred, such that the security interest attaches 
pre-petition and survives bankruptcy); In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330 (holding that when nei-
ther condition of sale has occurred, any right to receive value is too remote to exist; thus, 
the debtor does not have rights in the revenues from the future sale sufficient to make the 
security interest attach pre-petition and the security interest cannot survive bankruptcy); 
See also Sepinuck, supra note 4, at 5 (Explaining the debate over when the debtor acquires 
the right to receive sale revenues through a discussion of the In re Tracy bankruptcy court 
decision and the In re TerreStar decision). 
15 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269; infra notes 21–349 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 21–108 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 109–181 and accompanying text. 
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funds has been found to exist before the contingencies required to re-
ceive those funds have occurred; specifically, in pension plan refunds, 
contingency fee agreements, and sale revenues from a liquor license.18 
Finally, Part IV argues that the FCC licensee’s right to receive future 
sale revenues similarly exists before the sale revenues themselves do— 
upon the acquisition of the FCC license—based on the similar charac-
teristics of the previously analyzed industries and the broadcasting 
market.19 It is not the debtor’s right to receive revenues that is contin-
gent, but the value of that right; thus, a security interest in the proceeds 
from the future sale of a debtor’s FCC license survives bankruptcy.20 
I. The Role of an FCC License in a Secured Transaction 
A. Spectrum Licenses and the FCC 
 Wireless communication is made possible through the use of the 
spectrum—a range of radio frequencies over which information can be 
sent through the airwaves.21 The ability to transmit information over 
the spectrum allows parties to communicate without the bulky infra-
structure of communication via wires.22 Additionally, the spectrum al-
lows for flexibility in communication, as radio waves can be transmitted 
in several different directions or targeted at one specific point.23 
 Although communicating over the spectrum has several advan-
tages, there are significant limitations associated with its use.24 The 
spectrum is a rivalrous resource; a particular frequency can only be 
used by one entity at any given time.25 Thus, the use of each specific 
frequency must be exclusive to ensure that one entity’s use does not 
interfere with another’s.26 Further, the spectrum is a finite resource; 
there are only a certain number of frequencies that can be used to 
transmit information.27 The necessary exclusivity of use, coupled with 
the finite frequencies available, makes the spectrum a scarce re-
                                                                                                                      
 
in et al., supra note 3, at 7. 
 
: Broadcast Media Mergers 
and v. 497, 503 (1997). 
 et al., supra note 3, at 15. 
18 See infra notes 182–281 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 282–349 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 282–349 and accompanying text.
21 See Benjam
22 Id. at 14.
23 Id. at 8. 
24 See id. at 15. 
25 Id. at 15, 32. 
26 See id. at 31; Mike Harrington, Note, A-B-C, See You Real Soon
 Ensuring a “Diversity of Voices,” 38 B.C. L. Re
27 Benjamin
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source.28 Our economic system strives to ensure that scarce resources, 
including the spectrum, are allocated to those who value them the 
most and are used in ways that maximize societal welfare.29 
                                                                                                                     
 The FCC is responsible for overseeing the use of the spectrum.30 
To accomplish this task, the FCC first determines which ranges of fre-
quency on the spectrum will be used for which telecommunications 
purposes.31 Within each range, the FCC creates licenses that allow the 
holder to operate on particular frequencies and within particular geo-
graphic areas for a limited period of time.32 Generally, an entity that 
wants to operate on the spectrum must obtain an FCC license.33 Most 
licenses are distributed through an auctioning process during which 
individual users or companies bid for a license.34 After the initial grant 
of the license, the FCC retains control over who uses it.35 A licensee 
may not transfer its license to another entity without FCC approval.36 In 
deciding whether to grant a license or allow a license transfer, the FCC 
must consider whether or not the intended use of the license will serve 
the public interest.37 
 
28 Id. at 32. 
29 Rupert G. Rhodd et al., The Use of Economic Pricing Models in Government Procurement, Se-
cond International Public Procurement Conference Proceedings 933, 933 (Interna-
tional Public Procurement Conference CD-ROM, Sept. 2006), available at http://www. 
ippa.ws/IPPC2/PROCEEDINGS/Article_38_Rhodd_et_al.pdf. 
30 Benjamin et al., supra note 3, at 62; Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and Its Re-
form 72 (1982); Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation Versus Antitrust: How Net Neutrality Is 
Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1627, 1643 (2011). 
31 Benjamin et al., supra note 3, at 62. This process is known as allocation. Id. For in-
stance, cell phones are operated on the range of 824–849 MHz, as well as other ranges. 
About the Spectrum Dashboard, REBOOT.FCC.GOV, http://reboot.fcc.gov/reform/systems/ 
spectrum-dashboard/about (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
32 Benjamin et al., supra note 3, at 62–63, 114. 
33 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (“No person shall use or operate any apparatus for the 
transmission of energy or communications or signals by radio . . . except . . . with a license 
. . . .”). Some parts of the spectrum may be used without a license if the FCC chooses to 
leave a particular range open for use. See Benjamin et al., supra note 3, at 62; FCC Encyclo-
pedia: Accessing Spectrum, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/accessing-spectrum (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
34 See Benjamin et al., supra note 3, at 177. License holders have the ability to petition 
for renewal of their license at the end of the license period. Id. at 114. 
35 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (“No . . . station license, or any rights thereunder, shall be trans-
ferred, assigned, or disposed of in any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indi-
rectly, or by transfer of control of any corporation holding such permit or license, to any 
person except upon application to the [Federal Communications] Commission . . . .”). 
36 Id. 
37 In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 262; see Harrington, supra note 26, at 506. Although “the 
public interest” has not been clearly defined, achieving a diversity of broadcast providers 
has consistently been found to serve the public interest. See Harrington, supra note 26, at 
506. 
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 FCC licenses, whether obtained by auction or by an approved sale 
from a previous holder, can be very expensive.38 Potential market en-
trants must have a license to use spectrum, but few have the capital 
needed to obtain one; thus, the ability of an entity to acquire a spectrum 
license usually depends on its ability to obtain financing.39 Any lender 
willing to finance a telecommunications provider will require that the 
provider offer collateral to secure the loan and ensure repayment.40 
 Telecommunications providers—unlike providers in other indus-
tries in which participants own real estate or inventory—have limited 
assets in which to grant a security interest.41 Essentially, telecommunica-
tions providers’ assets are limited to their broadcasting equipment, 
their FCC licenses, and the airtime the broadcasters can sell under 
their licenses.42 Additionally, entities that are planning to enter or are 
relatively new to the industry will have little cash flow with which to 
demonstrate their creditworthiness.43 
 Given the extraordinary value of an FCC license, it is often the 
most significant asset a telecommunications provider owns.44 As such, 
both creditors and telecommunications providers prefer to use the val-
ue of the license as collateral.45 To increase their protection in the 
event of the debtor’s default or bankruptcy, creditors want an interest 
in any revenues that might be generated by the license in the future.46 
Specifically, a creditor will seek a security interest in any proceeds that 
would derive from a future FCC-approved sale of the license.47 Typi-
cally, because the licensee depends on the FCC license to operate, such 
sales only occur after the licensee has entered bankruptcy.48 As such, it 
                                                                                                                      
38 Sepinuck, supra note 4, at 6. 
39 See 47 U.S.C. § 301; Sepinuck, supra note 4, at 6. 
40 See Fishman, supra note 7, at 17. 
41 See Montero, supra note 5. Telecommunications providers rarely own real estate; nor 
do they have a stockpile of valuable inventory given that what they are “selling” is the in-
tangible ability to communicate. See id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id.; Oxenford, supra note 10. 
45 See Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 24, 26. Creditors want to secure loans, especially 
large loans, with high-value collateral to increase their protection and decrease the risk of 
non-collectability. Id. at 23. The debtor is similarly benefitted; a creditor facing less risk will 
offer a loan with a lower rate of interest, reducing the cost of borrowing. Id. at 24. 
46 See id. at 23–24. Access to both current and future revenues increases the value of 
the license, making it more desirable as collateral. See id. 
47 See Oxenford, supra note 10. 
48 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269 n.13 (noting that a fact pattern in which the sale of 
an FCC license occurs before the licensee enters bankruptcy is a “narrow hypothetical”); 
Oxenford, supra note 10. 
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is very important to a creditor that its interest in the proceeds from a 
future sale survives the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.49 
B. Taking Security Interests in Future Collateral 
 Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs secu-
rity interests in personal property.50 An enforceable security interest 
provides a secured creditor with a lien on the collateral, allowing the 
creditor to repossess the property if the debtor defaults on the loan.51 A 
security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties 
until it attaches.52 Section 9–203(b) of the UCC outlines the three con-
junctive requirements necessary for attachment.53 Under this provision, 
the debtor must have rights in the collateral before a security interest 
can attach.54 
 The UCC does not explain what rights are sufficient to constitute 
“rights in the collateral” under section 9–203.55 Similarly, it does not in-
dicate when the debtor acquires rights in the collateral.56 It is clear that 
a debtor with full title and physical possession has sufficient rights.57 It is 
equally clear that a debtor not in possession of an item, and with no 
property or contractual interest in it, does not have sufficient rights in 
the collateral to grant a valid security interest.58 Between these two ex-
tremes, the question of whether the debtor has sufficient rights in the 
collateral to create a valid security interest is unclear.59 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Oxenford, supra note 10. 
50 U.C.C. § 9-109 (2003). 
51 Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 16. 
52 U.C.C. §§ 9-203(a), 9-308(a); see Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 74, 115. To be en-
forceable against third parties, an interest must also be perfected. Nimmer et al., supra 
note 10, at 115. Perfection requires attachment, plus an applicable statutory step. U.C.C. 
§ 9-308(a). 
53 U.C.C. § 9-203(b). Attachment requires that: (1) value has been given; (2) the debt-
or has rights in the collateral; and (3) one of four possible evidentiary conditions has been 
met. Id. 
54 Id. (“[A] security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties with re-
spect to the collateral only if . . . the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to 
transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party . . . .”). This rule is consistent with the 
general principle that one cannot give rights that they themselves do not have. Margit 
Livingston, Certainty, Efficiency, and Realism: Rights in Collateral Under Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 115, 118 (1994). 
55 Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 99; Livingston, supra note 54, at 116. 
56 Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 103. 
57 See Livingston, supra note 54, at 123–24 & n.44. 
58 See id. 
59 Id. 
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 Property that a debtor acquires after the creation of the security 
agreement is known as after-acquired property.60 There are two ways a 
creditor can obtain a security interest in after-acquired property.61 First, 
a creditor can include specific language in the security agreement tak-
ing an interest in the after-acquired property of a certain type.62 Sec-
ond, if a creditor has a valid security interest in collateral, a security in-
terest will also attach to anything that is proceeds of that collateral— 
even when those proceeds are acquired after the creation of the origi-
nal security agreement.63 Of the two ways a creditor may obtain a secu-
rity interest in after-acquired property described above, only the second 
will survive the commencement of a bankruptcy case.64 Under section 
9-203, a security interest in after-acquired property will not attach until 
the debtor gains rights in the after-acquired property.65 If the debtor 
has not yet acquired the property at the time the bankruptcy case 
commences, they do not have rights in the after-acquired property, and 
a security interest in the after-acquired property created under the first 
method will be invalid.66 
C. Survival of Security Interests in Future Collateral in Bankruptcy 
  Bankruptcy is a federal tool that an entity may use to restructure 
its debt, allowing creditors to recover all or part of the money owed to 
them while providing the debtor with a fresh start.67 When a party initi-
ates bankruptcy proceedings, a bankruptcy estate is created.68 A bank-
ruptcy estate consists of all of the debtor’s property at the time the case 
begins.69 Despite its sweeping coverage, a bankruptcy estate will typi-
cally be insufficient to cover all of the debts owed by the debtor.70 
                                                                                                                      
60 Black’s Law Dictionary 69 (9th ed. 2009). 
61 See U.C.C. §§ 9-204(a), 9-315(a) (2003). 
62 Id. § 9-204(a). A debtor cannot use this method for consumer goods, generally, or 
for a commercial tort claim. Id. § 9-204(b). 
63 Id. § 9-315(a). As defined under the UCC, proceeds includes, inter alia, “(A) what-
ever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral; 
(B) whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral; [and] (C) rights aris-
ing out of collateral . . . .” Id. § 9-102(a)(64). 
64 See 11 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
65 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2). 
66 See id. 
67 Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 254, 257–58. 
68 Id. at 259. A bankruptcy case is commenced upon the filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion, either voluntarily by the debtor or involuntarily by the creditors. Id. at 257. 
69 Id. at 259. 
70 Id. at 254. 
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 Secured creditors have an advantage in the bankruptcy process 
over their unsecured counterparts.71 Creditors with a valid lien have a 
property interest in the collateral that continues to be recognized 
throughout the bankruptcy proceeding.72 This interest entitles secured 
creditors to receive the full value of their secured claim from the collat-
eral defined in the security agreement.73 Unsecured creditors’ claims 
are paid on a pro-rata basis from the remaining assets of the estate that 
are not subject to an exemption or a security interest.74 
 The commencement of a bankruptcy case separates the world into 
two parts: “pre-petition” and “post-petition.”75 This distinction is of criti-
cal importance, as only those whose claim to payment arose pre-petition 
are creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding.76 Additionally, the applica-
bility of many Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) provisions depends on 
whether the debtor is operating pre-petition or post-petition.77 Section 
552 of the Code is one of these bankruptcy provisions.78 
 Section 552(a) provides that property acquired post-petition is not 
subject to any lien under a security agreement that was created pre-
petition.79 Essentially, this provision invalidates any after-acquired prop-
erty clause contained in a security agreement.80 Thus, a creditor who 
chooses to obtain a security interest in after-acquired property through 
reliance on an after-acquired property clause risks losing that interest in 
bankruptcy.81 
                                                                                                                      
71 Id. at 251. 
72 Id. Unsecured creditors have no property interest in any specific asset of the debtor. 
Id. 
73 Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 251. If the value of the collateral is less than the val-
ue of the claim, a security interest entitles a creditor to receive the full value of the collat-
eral. See id. at 269. 
74 Id. at 251. Unsecured creditors, then, have less of a chance of recovering the full 
value of their claim than secured creditors do. See id. 
75 Id. at 253. 
76 Id. Post-petition claimants are part of the debtor’s fresh start; the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding does not affect their rights. Id. 
77 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 544, 547, 552 (2006). 
78 Id. § 552. 
79 Id. § 552(a). 
80 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 266; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 329. An after-acquired 
property clause encumbers the relevant property pre-petition; however, the property is not 
acquired by the estate, and thus the security interest cannot attach, until the post-petition 
period. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2) (2003); Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 210. 
81 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a); In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 329. If the property is not acquired 
pre-petition, the security interest in it will be lost. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a); In re Tracy, 438 
B.R. at 329. 
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 Section 552(b) of the Code creates an exception to this general 
rule.82 When a security agreement grants a security interest in a type of 
collateral (the “original collateral”) as well as the proceeds of that col-
lateral, section 552(b) allows such proceeds acquired post-petition to 
remain subject to the creditor’s lien if the original collateral was ac-
quired pre-petition.83 The security interest in the original collateral 
must have been enforceable at the time of the bankruptcy filing for this 
provision to apply.84 With respect to the original collateral, then, the 
debtor must have had rights in the collateral pre-petition for a security 
interest to attach to the original collateral’s proceeds that were acquired 
post-petition.85 The practical implication of section 552 is that even if a 
creditor takes a security interest in a particular item, that interest will be 
destroyed in bankruptcy if the debtor acquires rights in that item post-
petition, and that item is not proceeds of original collateral that was ac-
quired pre-petition and subject to an attached security interest.86 
D. Security Interests in the Broadcasting Industry 
 There are two distinct packages of rights associated with an FCC 
license: public and private rights.87 The public rights of an FCC license 
encompass the right to decide who holds the license and for how 
long.88 A licensee has no property interest in the public rights; that in-
terest belongs to the FCC.89 The private rights of an FCC license in-
clude the right to receive payment from an approved transfer of the 
license, and they belong to the licensee.90 
 It is settled law that a debtor cannot grant a security interest di-
rectly in its FCC license.91 Section 310(d) of the Communications Act 
of 1934 (Communications Act) provides that licensees may not transfer 
                                                                                                                      
82 11 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
83 Id. “Proceeds” is not defined in the Code; thus, most courts apply the UCC defini-
tion. See, e.g., In re Bumper Sales, Inc., 907 F.2d 1430, 1437 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Tracy, 438 
B.R. at 329. 
84 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 270 n.14; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. 
85 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b); U.C.C. § 9-203(a). 
86 11 U.S.C. § 552. 
87 See In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 328; In re Ridgely Commc’ns, Inc., 139 B.R. 374, 378–79 
(Bankr. D. Md. 1992). 
88 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *3; In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 262–63; In re Ridge-
ly Commc’ns, Inc., 139 B.R. at 378-–79. 
89 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 262–63; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 327. 
90 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *3; In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 262–63; In re Ridge-
ly Commc’ns, Inc., 139 B.R. at 378–79. 
91 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *3; In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 262; In re 
O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. 986, 987 (1994). 
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their license or rights under the license to third parties without express 
approval from the FCC.92 A security interest in a license would poten-
tially require a debtor to transfer its license to a third party creditor 
without FCC approval—a clear violation of the Communications Act.93 
The FCC has interpreted this statute to mean that licensees are prohib-
ited from granting a security interest in the FCC license itself.94 
 Additionally, a licensee may not grant a security interest in the 
public rights of the license, because the public rights belong to the 
FCC, not the licensee.95 The FCC has stated that a licensee may, how-
ever, grant a security interest in its private right to receive the sale reve-
nues of an FCC license.96 This remains consistent with the Communica-
tions Act, because the only interest being conveyed is one in the assets 
received from a sale of the license.97 As a result, a creditor’s reposses-
sion right is not as broad as it is with other forms of collateral; a credi-
tor cannot unilaterally force the sale of an FCC license to obtain the 
sale revenues.98 Instead, the creditor must wait to exercise its reposses-
sion right until after a contract has been negotiated with the buyer and 
the sale has been approved by the FCC.99 Thus, the FCC continues to 
control who owns the license throughout the entire process, as re-
quired by federal law.100 
 Because a creditor cannot repossess a debtor’s right to sale reve-
nues, its security interest must extend to the sale revenues them-
                                                                                                                      
92 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2006) (“No . . . license, or any rights thereunder, shall be trans-
ferred, assigned, or disposed of in any manner . . . except upon application to the Com-
mission and upon finding by the Commission that the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity will be served thereby.”). 
93 In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987. A creditor who holds a valid security interest in an 
item may repossess the item upon the debtor’s default. Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 
16. Such a repossession would allow the license to transfer from the debtor licensee to the 
creditor without FCC approval, in violation of the Communications Act. See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 310(d); In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987. 
94 In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987. 
95 See U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (2003). The licensee has no property interest in the public 
rights; thus, it has no rights in them. See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 262–63; In re Tracy, 438 
B.R. at 327. 
96 In re O’Cheskey, 13 FCC Rcd. at 10,656, 10,660; G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy 
Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 3, 49 (2001). A debtor’s 
right to receive revenues from the sale of its FCC license is a general intangible. See In re 
TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 267–69; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. 
97 See In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987. 
98 See id.; Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 16. Typically, upon default, a creditor may 
seize the collateral and sell it to satisfy the debt. See Nimmer et al., supra note 10, at 16. 
99 See In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987. 
100 See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2006); In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987. 
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selves.101 Sale revenues are most often acquired post-petition; thus, the 
bankruptcy status of a creditor’s security interest in sale revenues usu-
ally turns on whether these revenues are considered proceeds of collat-
eral acquired pre-petition such that a security interest exists in them 
under section 552(b) of the Code.102 
 Sale revenues stem directly from the right to receive value from 
the transfer of an FCC license.103 As such, sale revenues are considered 
proceeds of the debtor’s right to receive value.104 To fall within the sec-
tion 552(b) exception, then, the original collateral—the debtor’s right 
to receive value for the transfer of its license—must have been acquired 
pre-petition and subject to an attached security interest.105 If the collat-
eral was acquired post-petition, section 522(a) would invalidate any se-
curity interest in the sale revenues and the section 552(b) exception 
would not apply.106 
 Thus, the essential question is when the debtor receives rights in 
the original collateral such that a security interest attaches.107 The an-
swer to this question turns on when the debtor’s right to receive value 
from a transfer of its license comes into existence.108 
II. The Current Debate: When Does a Licensee Acquire the 
Right to Revenues from the Sale of Its License? 
 Two recent cases illustrate the different ways that courts  may an-
swer the question of when a licensee acquires the right to receive reve-
nues from the sale of its FCC license.109 In October 2010, the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado, in In re Tracy Broadcast-
ing Corp., determined that a debtor’s right to receive value does not ex-
                                                                                                                      
101 See Oxenford, supra note 10. If a creditor has an interest in sale revenues, it can re-
possess them after the sale occurs. See In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987; Nimmer et al., 
supra note 10, at 16. 
102 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269 n.13; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. 
103 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *4. 
104 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (2003). 
105 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006). As explained above, the debtor is unable to give a se-
curity interest in the FCC license itself. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
106 See 11 U.S.C. § 552. 
107 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *6--7. 
108 See id.; U.C.C. § 9-203(b). 
109 See In re TerreStar Networks, Inc., 457 B.R. 254, 269 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re 
Tracy Broad. Corp., 438 B.R. 323, 330 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2010), aff’d, 469 B.R. 55 (D. Colo. 
2011), overruled by 2012 WL 4874485 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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ist until the sale of the license is adequately forthcoming.110 In that 
same month, in In re TerreStar Networks, Inc., the U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
for the Southern District of New York reached a contradictory conclu-
sion, and held that a debtor’s right to receive value from a transfer ex-
ists at the time the debtor acquires the FCC license.111 In re Tracy was 
ultimately overturned in October 2012 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, who used a similar policy-based rationale as the court 
in In re TerreStar.112 
 The two cases involved almost identical facts.113 In each, the 
debtor was a telecommunications provider that possessed an FCC li-
cense to operate over the spectrum.114 Each debtor, to obtain financ-
ing, granted its lender a security interest in its right to receive revenues 
from any future sale of its FCC license.115 The debtor in In re Tracy 
granted a security interest in its general intangibles, which included the 
right to sale revenues.116 The security agreement in In re TerreStar cov-
ered general intangibles, and also explicitly granted an interest in the 
debtor’s right to receive value in connection with the disposition of any 
FCC license it held.117 Both debtors filed for bankruptcy, and, at the 
time of filing, had not sold their FCC license.118 
                                                                                                                     
 In both In re TerreStar and In re Tracy, an unsecured creditor sought 
to invalidate the lender’s lien on the sale revenues.119 The creditor in 
In re TerreStar first argued that, because one cannot take a security in-
terest in an FCC license itself, the lender’s security interest was inva-
lid.120 The court quickly dismissed this argument, finding that although 
the lender did not have a security interest in the license itself, it did 
have a valid security interest in the debtor’s right to receive value from 
 
110 See In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. A sale of an FCC license becomes possible upon both 
1) the negotiation of a contract for sale with a third party and 2) the approval of such a 
sale by the FCC. Id. 
111 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269. 
112 See In re Tracy Broad. Corp., 2012 WL 4874485, at *7--*9 (10th Cir. 2012); In re Ter-
reStar, 457 B.R. at 269. 
113 See In re TerreStar, at 258–60; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 324–26. 
114 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 258; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 324–25. 
115 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 258; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 325. 
116 In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 325. A general intangible is any personalty “other than ac-
counts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, in-
struments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, 
or other minerals before extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and software.” 
U.C.C. § 9-102(42) (2003). 
117 In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 258. 
118 See id. at 261; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 325. 
119 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 257; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 325. 
120 In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 257. 
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a transfer of its license.121 The creditor in In re Tracy did not attempt to 
make this argument; all parties involved acknowledged that there was 
no security interest in the license itself.122 
                                                                                                                     
 Both creditors then attacked the lender’s security interest in the 
debtor’s right to receive sale revenues from the FCC license.123 The 
creditors sought to invalidate the interest under section 552 of the 
Code.124 The contract negotiation, FCC approval, and subsequent sale 
of the license did not occur pre-petition.125 If the sale occurrs post-
petition, the sale revenues would necessarily be acquired post-petition; 
thus, section 552(a) would invalidate any security interest in them.126 
The creditors argued that the original collateral from which the sale 
revenues were proceeds—the debtor’s right to receive the value from a 
sale—would not materialize until after commencement of the bank-
ruptcy case, when it was certain that a sale would occur.127 Thus, the 
section 552(b) exception would not apply because the proceeds ac-
quired post-petition did not stem from original collateral acquired pre-
petition.128 
A. In re TerreStar Networks, Inc.: The Right to Receive Sale Revenues Exists 
at the Time the License Is Acquired 
 The In re TerreStar court rejected the unsecured creditor’s argu-
ment, and held that the lender’s security interest would remain valid in 
bankruptcy.129 The court took a functionalist approach; its rationale was 
not based on a reading of section 552, but was instead grounded in pol-
icy concerns.130 The court first asserted that it is an established rule that 
a creditor may take a security interest in a debtor’s right to receive value 
 
121 Id. at 265. 
122 In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 327. 
123 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 257; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 327. 
124 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 257; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 327. Section 552(a) of the 
Code invalidates a security interest in property that is acquired post-petition. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a) (2006). 
125 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 261; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. 
126 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a); In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 266; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 327. 
127 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 266; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 327. 
128 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 266, 269; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 327. See supra notes 
75–86 and accompanying text (explaining sections 552(a) and 552(b) of the Code and 
their effect on property acquired after the commencement of the bankruptcy case). 
129 In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269–70. 
130 See id. 
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from a transfer of its license.131 To find that a security interest in sale 
revenues could not attach when neither condition of sale has occurred 
would, according to the In re TerreStar court, render a security interest in 
a debtor’s right to receive value essentially meaningless.132 Such a rule 
effectively conditions the validity of a creditor’s lien on sale revenues on 
both the negotiation of a contract for sale of the license and the FCC’s 
approval of such a contract.133 These conditions are problematic, as the 
sale of a license rarely occurs pre-petition.134 Thus, a rule requiring one 
or both conditions of sale to be satisfied before a security interest in sale 
revenues could attach would mean that few, if any, security interests in a 
debtor’s right to receive value from a license transfer would survive in 
bankruptcy.135 
 Additionally, the court noted that the FCC has explicitly acknowl-
edged a licensee’s ability to grant a security interest in its right to sale 
revenues.136 Rendering a security interest in sale revenues meaningless 
would completely ignore the fact that the body that is responsible for 
creating and defining the right in question intended a licensee to be 
able to grant a security interest in that right.137 Practically, then, it does 
not make sense to adopt a rule that renders these approved liens effec-
tively impossible.138 
 Thus, the In re TerreStar court necessarily acknowledged that the 
debtor’s right to receive sale revenues from the FCC license existed pre-
petition, before either condition of sale occurred.139 The sale revenues 
themselves were acquired post-petition, and any security interest in the-
se revenues granted in the pre-petition security agreement would be 
invalidated under section 552(a) of the Code.140 Section 552(b)’s ex-
ception would apply here, however, because the sale revenues are pro-
                                                                                                                      
131 See id. at 264. To establish that it is in fact well-settled that a creditor may take a se-
curity interest in the debtor’s right to receive revenues from the sale of its FCC license, the 
court looked to prior case law as well as an FCC order. Id. at 262–64. 
132 See id. at 269–70. 
133 Id. at 269; see also In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330 (holding that the validity of a creditor’s 
lein is subject to these two conditions). 
134 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269 n.13. 
135 See id. at 269. 
136 Id. 
137 See id.; Benjamin et al., supra note 3, at 62–63. 
138 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269. 
139 See id. at 261. For an interest in the post-petition sale revenues to survive bank-
ruptcy—as the In re TerreStar court held it did—the revenues must have been proceeds 
from collateral acquired pre-petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a)–(b) (2006); In re TerreStar, 457 
B.R. at 259. Thus, the right to receive sale revenues must have been acquired pre-petition. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a)–(b). 
140 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a); In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 261. 
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ceeds of collateral that was acquired pre-petition—the right to receive 
sale revenues.141 
B. The Original In re Tracy Broadcasting Corp.: The Right to Receive Sale 
Revenues Cannot Exist When Neither Condition of Sale Has Occurred 
 The In re Tracy 2010 Bankruptcy Court decision (the “original In re 
Tracy decision”) agreed with the unsecured creditor, holding that sec-
tion 552(a) invalidated any security interest that the creditor may have 
had in the sale revenues.142 First, the court acknowledged that an FCC 
license contains both public and private rights, and presumed that a 
debtor is able to grant a security interest in its private right to the reve-
nues from the sale of a license.143 Next, the court found that the debt-
or’s right to receive sale revenues was contingent on two events: an 
agreement with a third party to sell the license, and the FCC’s approval 
of the sale.144 The court reasoned that in the absence of these two re-
quirements, any right to receive value is too remote to exist.145 Neither 
contingency had occurred as of the commencement of the bankruptcy 
case; thus, the right to receive value did not exist pre-petition.146 The 
right to receive value instead would come into existence post-petition, 
after the contract for sale was executed and the transfer was approved by 
the FCC.147 The collateral defined in the pre-petition security agree-
ment—the right to receive sale revenues—would thus be acquired, if at 
all, after the commencement of the bankruptcy case.148 As a result, the 
security interest in the collateral could not attach until the post-petition 
period.149 
 The court held that in such a situation, the post-petition acquisi-
tion of the collateral would trigger section 552(a) of the Code.150 Be-
cause a security interest in the right to receive sale revenues would not 
                                                                                                                      
141 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b); In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 270 n.14; U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) 
(2003). The second requirement of 552(b)—that the proceeds at issue are covered by the 
security agreement—was satisfied because the pre-petition security agreement extended to 
the sale revenues themselves, as well as the right to receive sale revenues. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b); In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 258. 
142 In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330–31. 
143 Id. at 328. 
144 Id. at 330. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. At the time of the case, neither contingency had occurred. Id. 
148 In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. 
149 Id. 
150 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006) (invalidating after-acquired property clauses when 
the property has not been acquired at the time the bankruptcy case is commenced). 
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attach until after the commencement of the bankruptcy case, section 
552(a) invalidated the creditor’s pre-petition lien.151 Additionally, nei-
ther the right to receive sale revenues nor the sale revenues themselves 
fell under the section 552(b) exception; neither were proceeds of any 
collateral that was acquired pre-petition.152 In so holding, the court did 
not specify whether the occurrence of one contingency would bring 
the right to receive value into existence, or if both a contract for sale 
and FCC approval would need to occur before a debtor acquired the 
right to receive sale proceeds.153 
C. In re Tracy Broadcasting Corp. Revisited: The Right to Receive Sale 
Revenues Exists at the Time the License Is Acquired 
 In October 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
reversed the original In re Tracy decision and held that a debtor’s right 
to receive revenues from the sale of its FCC license exists even before 
either condition of sale has occurred.154 The court relied primarily on a 
results-oriented policy argument to support this conclusion.155 Just like 
the court in In re TerreStar, the In re Tracy court recognized that if a se-
curity interest were not able to attach before either condition of sale 
had occurred, the value of the security interest would be very low.156 
This would devastate the telecommunications industry, as granting a 
security interest in the debtor’s right to receive sale revenues “may well 
be the licensee’s best tool to obtain capital.”157 
 The court continued beyond this overt policy rationale and noted 
that state law also supports the conclusion that a debtor’s rights in the 
collateral exist even when a sale is not imminent.158 Section 9-408 of 
the Nebraska UCC overrides state laws requiring a licensee to obtain 
government consent before transferring a license to the extent that 
                                                                                                                      
151 See In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. 
152 See id. Both the sale revenues and right to receive sale revenues are proceeds of the 
license. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64). Because one cannot take a security interest in an FCC 
license itself, the sale revenues and the right to receive sale revenues are not proceeds of 
collateral acquired pre-petition. See In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 326–27. The sale revenues are 
also proceeds of the right to receive revenues, but that collateral was not acquired pre-
petition. See id. at 330. 
153 See id. 
154 In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *6, *13. 
155 See id. at *8. 
156 See id. at *8; In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269–70. 
157 In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *8. 
158 Id. at *9. This case was filed in Nebraska federal court, and thus the court was ana-
lyzing Nebraska state law. Id. at *1. 
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such law would prevent the attachment of a security interest in the li-
cense.159 Essentially, the Nebraska statute allows attachment of security 
interests in a state government-issued license, regardless of whether the 
debtor cannot transfer that license without government approval.160 
The creditor would not be able to force a sale or transfer of the license; 
instead, the creditor would have to wait for the government to approve 
a sale in order for the creditor to repossess the sale revenues.161 
                                                                                                                     
 The court acknowledged that the Nebraska law is state law and, as 
such, does not apply to the federal restrictions on sale present in the 
FCC licensing context.162 Regardless, the court stated, the existence of 
and rationale behind the Nebraska law supports the idea that a security 
interest in the right to receive sale revenues of an FCC license attaches 
at the time the security agreement is executed.163 The Nebraska state 
law would cover licenses that are identical to FCC licenses, except for 
the fact that they are issued and regulated by the state government in-
stead of the federal government.164 The court stated that because the 
Nebraska state law finds security interests in these licenses to be valid, 
the state legislature has implicitly recognized that attachment of the 
security interest occurs at the time the security agreement was cre-
ated.165 As such, because attachment requires rights in the collateral, 
the debtor must have had rights in the collateral at the time the security 
interest was created, before either condition of sale has been met.166 If 
the only difference between FCC licenses and the licenses covered by 
the Nebraska state law is the fact that FCC licenses are federal, not state, 
 
159 See Neb. Rev. St. Ann. U.C.C. § 9-408 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2011)(“A rule of 
law, statute, or regulation that . . . requires the consent of a government, governmental 
body or official . . . to the assignment or transfer of, or creation of a security interest in, a 
. . . general intangible, including a contract, permit, license . . . is ineffective to the extent 
that the rule of law, statute, or regulation: (1) would impair the creation, attachment, or 
perfection of a security interest . . . .”); In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9. 
160 See Neb. Rev. St. Ann. U.C.C. § 9-408; In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9. 
161 See Neb. Rev. St. Ann. U.C.C. § 9-408; In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9--10. 
162 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9--10. The requirement that the FCC must ap-
prove a transfer of a license is federal law; the Nebraska statute explicitly only applies to 
restrictions created by state law. See id. at *11; Benjamin et al., supra note 3, at 62. 
163 In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9--10. 
164 Id. at *9, *11. 
165 In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9--10. A security interest must attach in order to 
be valid; thus, a finding that a security interest is valid necessarily requires a finding that 
the security interest has attached. See Neb. Rev. St. Ann. U.C.C. § 9-203. 
166 See Neb. Rev. St. Ann. U.C.C. § 9-203(b); In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9--10, 
*13. This rationale is problematic, however, because it assumes that the Nebraska state 
legislature is not just making an exception to the normal attachment rules for licenses of 
this type. See infra notes 175–179 and accompanying text. 
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then the logic and rationale behind the Nebraska state law is equally 
applicable to federal licenses as well---the same rights and interests exist 
under both the state and federal licenses.167 Thus, the court reasoned, 
because Nebraska state law would encompass the same kinds of licenses 
as FCC licenses but at the state level, the rationale of the Nebraska state 
law provides support for reaching the same conclusion---that the secu-
rity interests are valid---at the federal level.168 
D. The Current State of the Controversy 
 Although the original In re Tracy decision has been overturned and 
now aligns with the conclusion in In re TerreStar, this issue has not been 
resolved.169 In re TerreStar and In re Tracy are currently the only two cases 
to directly consider when the right to receive revenues from the sale of 
an FCC license actually comes into existence.170 As this issue continues 
to be presented to courts, it is possible that some courts will reach the 
same conclusion, using the same rationale, as the court in the original 
In re Tracy decision.171 
 Furthermore, both In re TerreStar and In re Tracy take a functional 
approach and rely on policy arguments to reach their conclusion.172 
Other courts may be reluctant to follow, and may instead prefer to base 
their decision on legal principles and the UCC.173 Thus, it is important 
to show why a debtor’s right to receive sale revenues exists at the time 
the license is acquired, so that future courts may rely on section 9-203 
of the UCC to find that these security interests did in fact attach pre-
petition, before either condition of sale has occurred.174 
 Although the court in In re Tracy looked to the Nebraska UCC for 
additional support, this does not provide an actual legal basis for their 
                                                                                                                      
167 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9, 12. 
168 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9. 
169 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *13; In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269–70. 
170 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *13; In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269–70. A few 
other courts have held that a security interest in the right to receive sale revenues attaches 
at the time the licensee acquires the license, but do not involve a direct discussion of why a 
licensee’s right to receive sale revenues can exist before either condition of sale has oc-
curred. See MLQ Investors, L.P. v. Pacific Quadracasting, 146 F.3d 746 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Urban Communicators PCS L.P. v. Gabriel Capital, L.P., 394 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re 
Media Properties, 311 B.R. 244 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2004). 
171 See In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. 
172 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *8--10; In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269–70. 
173 See U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (2003); In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *8--10; In re TerreStar, 
457 B.R. at 269–70; infra notes 282–349 and accompanying text. 
174 See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2). 
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conclusion.175 The Nebraska UCC applies only to state law; by its terms, 
it does not apply in the FCC licensing context because FCC licenses 
and their restrictions are created by federal law.176 Additionally, the 
Nebraska UCC provision means that the Nebraska state legislature is 
stating that attachment has occurred at the time the security interest 
was created.177 The court assumed that this means that the Nebraska 
state legislature believes that the licensee had rights in the collateral at 
the time the security interest was created, before either condition of 
sale had occurred.178 This rationale is problematic, however, as it is pos-
sible that the Nebraska legislature was making an exception---essentially 
saying that even though the debtor in these license situations do not 
have rights in the collateral, and thus the formal UCC attachment re-
quirements are not met, it thinks these security interests should attach 
regardless.179 Finally, there are many states that have a section 9-408 
that differs from that of Nebraska; the In re Tracy court’s discussion of 
the provision, therefore, may not be applicable in those states.180 Thus, 
there is still a need for a legal hook that would be applicable in the fed-
eral context of FCC licensing, and would apply regardless of the spe-
cific provisions of each state’s UCC.181 
                                                                                                                      
175 In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9. 
176 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9--10; Benjamin et al., supra note 3, at 62. 
177 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9. 
178 See id; supra notes 158–168 and accompanying text. 
179 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9. In fact, this is the more likely interpretation 
when considering the canon of statutory construction that one should not construe words 
as to make them superfluous. Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation 88 (2011). If 
the Nebraska state legislature believed that licensees had sufficient rights in the collateral 
despite the requirement of government consent to transfer, then a security interest would 
attach under § 9-203 and § 9-408 would be superfluous. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2)(2003). 
180 For example, New York has omitted § 9-408(c) from its UCC. N.Y. U.C.C. Law § 9-
408 (McKinney 2002). Additionally, the following states have omitted subsection (e) of § 9-
408 from their UCCs: Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-9-408 (2012); D.C. 
Code § 28:9-408 (LexisNexis 2001); Ga. Code Ann. § 11-9-408 (2002 & Supp. 2012); Haw. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 490:9-408 (LexisNexis 2009); Idaho Code Ann. § 28-9-408 (2001 & 
Supp. 2012); 810 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5 / 9-408(West 2004); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 9-1408 (Supp. 2011); Minn. Stat. § 336.9-408 (2012 & Supp. 2011); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 104.9408 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 41-09-70 (2010 & Supp. 2011); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 1309.408 (West 2004); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 1-9-408 (West 2001 & Supp. 
2012); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-408 (2003); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 9.408 (West 2011 
& Supp. 2012); Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-408 (LexisNexis 2009); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9A, 
§ 9--408 (2001); Va. Code Ann. § 8.9A-408 (2001 & Supp. 2012); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 62A.9A-408 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 409.408 (West 2003). 
181 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *9--10. 
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III. The Existence of a Debtor’s Rights in Contingent  
Rights to Payment 
 The need to take a security interest in a right to funds, when the 
funds may or may not exist depending on some future event, is not 
unique to creditors in the broadcasting industry.182 Whether the debtor’s 
right to such funds exists before the triggering events occur has been an 
issue of debate in several other situations involving contingent rights to 
payment.183 This Part looks at three such situations: (1) a debtor’s right 
to receive a refund of a pension plan contribution,184 (2) a debtor’s 
right to receive payment pursuant to a contingency fee agreement,185 
and (3) a debtor’s right to receive proceeds from the sale of a liquor 
license.186 In all three situations, courts have found attachment of a se-
curity interest when the respective contingencies had not yet occurred; 
thus, necessarily, the debtor’s right to the future funds existed before 
the event triggering the creation of the funds occurred.187 
A. Scenario 1: The Right to a Pension Plan Refund 
 At the most basic level, a pension plan is a mechanism by which an 
employee receives income after retirement.188 Depending on the type 
of pension plan established, the pension is funded in part by contribu-
tions from the employer.189 Although a pension plan is created to last 
indefinitely, there are circumstances in which an employer may termi-
nate its plan.190 Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
                                                                                                                      
182 See Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 267 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2001) (discussing the ability 
to take a security interest in a debtor’s right to receive a contingency fee); In re Main St. 
Beverage Corp., 232 B.R. 303, 305 (D.N.J. 1998) (discussing the ability to take a security 
interest in a debtor’s right to receive revenues from a state-approved sale of its liquor li-
cense); In re Long Chevrolet, Inc., 79 B.R. 759, 761 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (discussing the ability 
to take a security interest in a debtor’s right to receive a pension refund). 
183 See Timothy F. Boyce, Collateralizing Nonassignable Contracts, Licenses, and Permits: Half 
a Loaf Is Better Than No Loaf, 52 Bus. Law. 559, 562, 569–71 (1997). 
184 See  notes 188–224 and accompanying text. 
185 See infra notes 225–251 and accompanying text. 
186 See infra notes 252–281 and accompanying text. 
187 See In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 765; In re Kluchman, 59 B.R. 13, 16 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 1985); PNC Bank v. Berg, No. 94C-09-208-WTQ, 1997 WL 527978, at *9–10 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 31, 1997) (unpublished opinion). 
188 Retirement Plans, Benefits, & Savings, U.S. Dep’t Lab., http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/ 
retirement/index.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
189 See Frequently Asked Questions About Pension Plans and ERISA, U.S. Dep’t Lab., http:// 
www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_compliance_pension.html (last visited Oct 12, 2012). 
190 Id. 
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of 1974 (“ERISA”), an employer in such circumstances has the right to 
receive a refund of their contributions to the plan.191 
 When a debtor who is contributing to a pension plan seeks financ-
ing, a potential creditor may wish to use any future pension plan re-
fund to secure the obligation.192 To avoid invalidation of a security in-
terest in the refund in bankruptcy under section 552(a) of the Code, a 
creditor must ensure that it has an enforceable pre-petition security 
interest in the collateral of which the refund is proceeds.193 Specifically, 
the creditor will want to create a valid pre-petition security interest in 
the debtor’s right to a pension plan refund.194 
 An employer’s right to a pension plan refund for its contributions 
is guaranteed by federal statute.195 The employer does not, however, 
automatically receive the refund upon termination of the plan.196 Be-
fore the employer can obtain the refund, it must first pay all liabilities 
due under the plan to the employee beneficiaries.197 The employer 
may then take possession of the remaining funds.198 
                                                                                                                     
 According to the reasoning of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Colorado, in the 2010 case In re Tracy Broadcasting Corp., a 
debtor’s right to a pension plan refund is subject to two contingencies: 
(1) the termination of the plan, and (2) the distribution of funds to all 
beneficiaries with claims against the pension plan.199 Unlike in the orig-
inal In re Tracy decision, however, courts faced with this scenario in the 
 
191 See 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(1) (2006). In order for the refund to be given to the em-
ployer, the employer must have stated the right to such a distribution in its pension plan, 
paid all of its liabilities under the plan, and ensured that the refund would otherwise ac-
cord with the law. See id. 
192 See In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 762; In re Nw. Acceptance Corp., 93 B.R. 243, 244 
(Bankr. D. Or. 1988); In re Guterl Special Steel Corp., 91 B.R. 721, 722 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1988). 
193 See 11 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
194 See In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 762; In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 244; In re Gu-
terl, 91 B.R. at 722. The refund is proceeds of the debtor’s right to receive a pension plan 
refund; thus, under section 552(b), a refund acquired post-petition would be subject to a 
valid security interest as long as the creditor had a valid pre-petition security interest in the 
debtor’s right to receive the refund. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a)–(b); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) 
(2003). 
195 See 29 U.S.C. § 1344; In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 765. 
196 See 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d). 
197 See id.; In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 764. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
must approve the allocation, and then actually distribute the funds before the debtor can 
receive a refund. See In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 765; In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 247. 
198 See 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d). 
199 See id.; In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 764; In re Tracy Broad. Corp., 438 B.R. 323, 330 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2010), aff’d, 469 B.R. 55 (D. Colo. 2011), overruled by 2012 WL 4874485 
(10th Cir. 2012). 
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pension plan context have held that a security interest in an employer’s 
right to a pension plan refund attaches pre-petition, even when the 
plan is not terminated until after commencement of the bankruptcy 
case.200 Thus, the debtor’s right to a refund, although subject to two 
conditions that have not yet occurred, is immediate enough to consti-
tute sufficient rights in the collateral.201 
 In 1987, in In re Long Chevrolet, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois held that an employer’s right to a pension 
plan refund existed at the time the security interest in the right was 
granted, even though the steps necessary to actually convey the refund 
had not yet been taken.202 Long Chevrolet, the debtor, had excess con-
tributions to the pension plan trust in the amount of $187,000.203 Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC”), its creditor, had been 
granted a security interest in Long Chevrolet’s general intangibles, in-
cluding the debtor’s right to a pension plan refund.204 Subsequently, 
Long Chevrolet requested to use its excess contributions to reopen its 
business.205 GMAC argued that Long Chevrolet could not spend the 
pension plan refund, as GMAC had a security interest in the funds by 
virtue of its security interest in the debtor’s right to receive the re-
fund.206 
 Long Chevrolet argued that it did not have a right to the pension 
plan refund until, at the earliest, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpo-
ration (“PBGC”) determined all of the liabilities of the plan such that 
the amount that would be refunded to Long Chevrolet was certain.207 
The bankruptcy case commenced before that occurred, however, and 
thus, Long Chevrolet asserted that GMAC’s security interest did not 
attach pre-petition.208 GMAC argued that Long Chevrolet had the right 
                                                                                                                      
200 See In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 244; In re Guterl, 91 B.R. at 725. In this scenario, 
because the plan has not been terminated until after commencement of the case, neither 
contingency required for the employer to receive its refund has occurred. See In re Nw. 
Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 245; In re Guterl, 91 B.R. at 723. 
201 See In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 244; In re Guterl, 91 B.R. at 725. 
202 See 79 B.R. at 765. 
203 Id. at 761. 
204 Id. at 762. The right to a pension plan refund is a general intangible. See In re Nw. 
Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 250. 
205 In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 761. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 762. 
208 Id. 
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to the pension plan refund at the time the pension plan was created, 
such that attachment occurred at the time of the grant.209 
 The court agreed with GMAC and found that the debtor’s refund 
right arose under both statute and contract, by way of ERISA and the 
reservation of such right in the pension plan contract.210 The court 
held that the debtor’s right to the refund was not contingent, even 
though certain conditions needed to occur before the debtor could 
receive the refund.211 Therefore, GMAC had an enforceable security 
interest in the debtor’s right to a pension plan refund post-petition.212 
 The rationale underlying this holding was explicitly discussed the 
following year in In re Northwest Acceptance Corp., where the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court for the District of Oregon also held that an employer’s 
right to a pension plan refund exists at the time the security interest is 
granted.213 In In re Northwest, McGrew Brothers Sawmill, Inc., the debt-
or, granted Northwest, its lender, a security interest in its general intan-
gibles, including the debtor’s right to a pension plan refund and the 
proceeds thereof.214 A year later, McGrew filed for bankruptcy.215 Sub-
sequently, McGrew terminated its pension plan, and, after the PBGC 
took the necessary steps, McGrew received its pension refund.216 
Northwest argued that the refund was proceeds of its pre-petition secu-
rity interest in the debtor’s right to receive a pension plan refund such 
that Northwest was entitled to the refund under the security agree-
ment.217 The bankruptcy trustee claimed that the debtor’s right to the 
pension refund was too remote and contingent to allow a security in-
terest in it to attach pre-petition because the plan was not terminated 
until after the bankruptcy case commenced.218 
                                                                                                                      
209 Id. at 764–65. GMAC argued that the contract establishing the pension plan identi-
fied that the debtor had the right to a pension refund such that, under ERISA, the debtor 
acquired the right at the time the contract was made. See id. 
210 Id. at 765. 
211 See In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 765 (“[the] fact that Long had to wait for the 
PBGC to approve the allocation . . . does not mean that it had no right to that property 
prior to that time. . . . [U]nder [ERISA] and the pension plan contract, Long’s right to the 
refund was fixed . . . .”). 
212 Id. at 766. 
213 See 93 B.R. at 244. 
214 Id. at 244, 250. 
215 Id. at 245. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 244. 
218 Id. The bankruptcy trustee—and not the debtor itself—was the other party in this 
case, as it was the trustee who held the pension refund to administer as part of the estate. 
Id. 
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 The court disagreed and held that the debtor’s right to a pension 
plan refund came into existence when the pension plan was created.219 
The court went one step further than the court in In re Long Chevrolet, 
however, and identified the debtor’s right to the pension plan refund as 
a reversion.220 Thus, the debtor’s right to a refund was neither contin-
gent nor remote.221 In classifying the nature of the conditions required 
for distribution of the refund, the court reasoned that it is the value of 
the right, not the right itself, which is subject to the contingencies.222 
The amount of the refund depends on the statutory conditions 
(mainly, the termination of the plan and the amount of liability as-
serted against the plan).223 The right to the refund is absolute—even if 
that right is ultimately valueless because the conditions fail to occur.224 
B. Scenario 2: The Right to a Contingency Fee 
 A contingency fee allows a client to delay payment for legal ser-
vices pending the outcome of the case.225 If the outcome is not favor-
able to the client, the client need not pay the legal fees.226 The specific 
terms of such an arrangement are outlined in an agreement between 
the attorney and client before the attorney begins work on the case.227 
Some agreements—known as contingency agreements—state that the 
value of the fee to be paid is equal to a certain percentage of the cli-
ent’s recovery from the case.228 Thus, there are potentially two contin-
gencies that must occur before a lawyer receives payment from the cli-
                                                                                                                      
219 In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 250. 
220 Id. at 249. A reversion is the “interest that is left after subtracting what the trans-
feror has parted with from what the transferor originally had.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 
supra note 60, at 362. The debtor, through the creation of the pension plan, was not grant-
ing the participants all of the funds held in the trust. In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 248. 
Thus any excess funds in the trust would automatically revert back to the debtor. Id. at 
248–49. 
221 In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249. Reversion as a matter of law is not contingent or 
remote. Id. 
222 See id.(“[I]t is logical one may hold a vested reversionary interest with enjoyment 
postponed with a present value which, upon elimination of the prior possessory interest at 
some future date, may then be valueless.”). 
223 See id. 
224 See id. 
225 Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 60, at 362. 
226 Id. 
227 See Cadle, 267 F.3d at 16; U.S. Claims, Inc. v. Flomenhaft & Cannata, LLC, 519 F. 
Supp. 2d 515, 519 (E.D. Pa. 2007); In re Holstein, Mack, & Klein, 2000 WL 343795, at *1 
n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000); PNC Bank, 1997 WL 527978, at *8. 
228 Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 60, at 362. 
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ent.229 First, the outcome of the case must be favorable to the client; 
and second, the amount to be recovered by the plaintiff from the suit 
must be identified.230 
 Courts have allowed creditors to take security interests in a debtor’s 
right to a contingency fee established in a contingency fee agree-
ment.231 Courts have found that when a debtor has a contingency fee 
contract pre-petition, but the requisite conditions for payment have not 
occurred at the time of petition, the security interest in the debtor’s 
right to the contingency fee nevertheless survives bankruptcy.232 In so 
holding, courts have used the same reasoning underlying the In re 
Northwest decision regarding pension plans.233 The debtor has an abso-
lute right to the contingency fee, even if the value of the fee depends on 
the occurrence of conditions that determine when and how much pay-
                                                                                                                     
ment is due.234 
 In 1997, the Superior Court of Delaware, in PNC Bank v. Berg, held 
that a creditor may take a security interest in both an hourly fee con-
tract and a contingency fee contract, and thus, by implication, in the 
debtor’s right to legal fees arising under those contracts.235 Although 
this case did not involve bankruptcy, the court engaged in a discussion 
of the debtor’s right to payment arising under a contingency fee 
agreement.236 The court held that a firm’s right to payment under a fee 
contract, whether hourly or contingent, is a right to payment that has 
 
, 267 F.3d at 20; In re Holstein, 2000 WL 343795, at *8; PNC Bank, 1997 
WL
, 267 F.3d at 20; In re Holstein, 2000 WL 343795, at *8; PNC Bank, 1997 
WL
9 F. Supp. 2d at 523; In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249; PNC Bank, 
199
e case. Id. at *9. The value of the contract depends upon the number 
of h
scussion of the nature of contingency fee contracts and the firm’s rights to 
pay
229 See id. 
230 See id. 
231 See, e.g., Cadle
 527978, at *10. 
232 See, e.g., Cadle
 527978, at *10. 
233 See U.S. Claims, 51
7 WL 527978, at *9. 
234 See U.S. Claims, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 523; PNC Bank, 1997 WL 527978, at *9. 
235 See PNC Bank 1997 WL 527978, at *9–10 (unpublished opinion). An hourly fee con-
tract gives the attorney a right to payment that is earned upon the attorney’s future com-
pletion of work on th
ours worked. Id. 
236 Id. This case concerned attorneys who left a firm to create their own, and, in so do-
ing, took client files related to cases for which their previous firm had contingency fee 
contracts. Id. at *2. The court sought to determine whether a creditor who had a security 
interest in the previous firm’s accounts and general intangibles thus had an interest in the 
files related to the firm’s contingency fee contracts such that the creditor could prevent 
the attorneys from taking them. Id. at *7. The court noted that the fee agreements were 
contract rights and thus fell under the category of accounts. Id. at *9. The court then en-
gaged in a di
ment. Id. 
2012] Security Interests in Revenues from the Sale of an FCC License 1833 
not yet been earned.237 The amount of payment—not the right to it— 
depends on the future events.238 In the hourly fee situation, the value 
of the payment depends on how much work the attorney performs in 
the future.239 Alternatively, with a contingency fee, it depends on the 
client’s recovery in the case.240 The court noted that the value of the 
contingency fee right may be more speculative than that of the hourly 
fee right, but that distinction is irrelevant for purposes of analyzing the 
ist
r she must have for 
e g
ists.249 The client has an obligation to pay, which is created by the terms 
                                                                                                                     
ex ence of the underlying right to payment.241 
 Additionally, in the 2007 case, U.S. Claims, Inc. v. Flomenhaft & 
Cannata, LLC, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania also discussed the nature of a right to payment arising under a 
contingency fee contract.242 This case dealt with the sales of accounts, 
including the sale of unmatured contingency fee contracts.243 The 
court’s reasoning can still be applied to cases involving security inter-
ests, though, because a sale of accounts is not enforceable unless a 
debtor-seller has rights in the collateral, just as he o
th rant of a security interest to be enforceable.244 
 In this case, the court differentiated between the right to payment 
arising from a contingency fee contract and a plaintiff’s right to pay-
ment arising in a tort suit that has yet to be decided.245 In the latter 
case, the right to payment itself is what is contingent.246 If the tort 
plaintiff loses its lawsuit, it does not mean that the value of the right to 
payment is zero—rather, there exists no right to payment at all.247 A 
favorable outcome in a tort suit establishes the plaintiff’s right to pay-
ment; before the court renders a judgment, however, there is no legal 
instrument under which a defendant has an obligation to pay the plain-
tiff.248 Alternatively, the attorney’s right to a contingency always ex-
 
237 Id. at 9. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 PNC Bank, 1997 WL 527978, at *9. 
242 519 F. Supp. 2d at 522–23. 
243 Id. at 519, 524. An unmatured contingency fee is classified as an account under the 
UCC. Id. at 523; U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2003). 
244 U.C.C. § 9-203. Sales of accounts fall under the scope of Article 9, and are subject to 
the same attachment rules as security interests. Id. § 9-109. 
245 U.S. Claims, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 522–23. 
246 Id. at 523. 
247 See id. 
248 Id. at 522–23. 
249 See id. 
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of the contingency contract.250 How much the client is obligated to pay 
is what depends on the outcome of the case.251 
                                                                                                                     
C. Scenario 3: The Right to Proceeds from the Sale of a Liquor License 
 An entity interested in serving liquor on its premises must obtain a 
liquor license.252 Liquor licenses are created, defined, and regulated by 
each state.253 Most state governments have instituted transfer restric-
tions on liquor licenses.254 In these states, entities wishing to sell their 
liquor licenses must get government approval before any such transfer 
can occur, just as the holder of an FCC license must obtain FCC ap-
proval before transferring its license to a third party.255 
 The rights and restrictions associated with a liquor license vary de-
pending on the state.256 Thus, the determination of how to approach 
security interests in liquor licenses, as well as the assumptions of the 
nature of the liquor licenses themselves, vary by state.257 Some courts 
have acknowledged a distinction between the right to use and the right 
to receive payment from the sale of a liquor license.258 This distinction 
is similar to that made in the FCC licensing context; thus, the reasoning 
in these cases is most applicable to the facts of the FCC license situa-
tion.259 These courts have found that, just as in the FCC context, a cred-
itor may not take a security interest in a liquor license itself.260 The 
debtor’s rights under the license, however, may be subject to a security 
interest, and such an interest would survive bankruptcy.261 
 
250 Id. 
251 U.S. Claims, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 523. 
252 See Linda L. Munden, Retail Liquor Licenses and Due Process: The Creation of Property 
Through Regulation, 32 Emory L.J. 1199, 1199–1200 (1983). 
253 See id. 
254 See id. at 1200, 1209–10, 1220–21, 1231. 
255 See id; supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC license trans-
fer process). 
256 See Douglas Robert Brown, The Restaurant Manager’s Handbook: How to 
Set Up, Operate, and Manage a Financially Successful Food Service Operation C1-
15 (2003); Munden, supra note 252, at 1200. 
257 See Boyce, supra note 183, at 562 (explaining the different approaches courts have 
taken in deciding this issue). 
258 Id. 
259 See In re TerreStar Networks, Inc., 457 B.R. 254, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re 
Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330; In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. 986, 987 (1994). As such, this note lim-
its its scope to these cases. See infra notes 260–349 and accompanying text. 
260 See In re Main St., 232 B.R. at 310; In re Kluchman, 59 B.R. at 15. 
261 See In re Kluchman, 59 B.R. at 16. These rights would include the right to receive 
proceeds from the sale of the liquor license. Id. at 15. 
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 In 1985, in In re Kluchman, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania held that a creditor could have a valid 
security interest in the proceeds from the post-petition sale of a debt-
or’s liquor license by virtue of its pre-petition security interest in the 
debtor’s rights under the license.262 The debtor had granted a security 
interest in its property rights and interests.263 The court found that the 
liquor license itself is not a licensee’s property, and thus could not be 
subject to a security interest.264 The licensee does have certain rights 
under the license, however, including the right to receive revenues 
from an approved sale of the license.265 These rights constitute prop-
erty in which a security interest may be granted.266 
 The In re Kluchman court, by implication, found that the debtor’s 
right to receive revenue from the sale of the license existed before the 
sale of the license occurred; therefore, the debtor had adequate rights 
in the collateral for attachment purposes.267 The court reasoned that 
the creditor’s security interest in the debtor’s interest in its liquor li-
cense was perfected pre-petition.268 Perfection by definition means that 
the security interest attached, which requires that the debtor have 
rights in the collateral.269 At the time the bankruptcy case commenced, 
the liquor license had not yet been sold.270 Consequently, the debtor 
had rights in the collateral—including its right to receive proceeds 
from the sale of the license—before any contingencies regarding the 
sale of the license occurred.271 In so holding, the court necessarily de-
termined that the right to receive proceeds from the sale of the liquor 
license was not too remote, even if the contingencies required for the 
sale had not yet occurred.272 Thus, the court must have used the same 
rationale underlying the In re Northwest decision regarding pension 
plans, finding that the contingencies associated with the sale of a liquor 
                                                                                                                      
262 Id. at 16. 
263 Id. at 14. 
264 See id. at 15. 
265 Id. 
266 See In re Kluchman, 59 B.R. at 16. These rights fell within the category of property 
interests, and thus were covered by the security agreement. See id. 
267 See id. 
268 See id. 
269 U.C.C. §§ 9-203(b), 9-308(a) (2003). 
270 In re Kluchman, 59 B.R. at 14. 
271 See id. at 16; U.C.C. § 9-203(b). 
272 See In re Kluchman, 59 B.R. at 16. If the court had believed that the right itself was 
too remote without the occurrence of the relevant contingencies, they would not have 
been able to find that it attached pre-petition, because the contingencies did not occur 
until after commencement of the bankruptcy case. See id. 
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license do not make the right itself contingent or remote, but instead 
affect only the value of the right.273 
 Moreover, in 1998, in In re Main Street Beverage Corp., the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey held that no valid security in-
terest existed in the debtor’s right to receive revenues from the sale of 
its liquor license.274 Despite this unfavorable outcome, the rationale 
behind the court’s decision does not contradict the idea that, in the 
FCC license context, a security interest in the debtor’s right to receive 
sale revenues can attach pre-petition.275 The court acknowledged that a 
liquor license has economic value that can be realized upon, for in-
stance, the sale of the license to a third party.276 This economic value, 
the court held, is not separable from the license itself.277 Thus, as a 
debtor may not grant a security interest directly in its liquor license, 
and the economic value of the license is not separable from the license 
itself, the debtor may not grant a security interest in its right to receive 
the economic value from the license.278 
 In explaining its holding, the In re Main Street court noted that the 
governmental entity creating the license has the ability to dictate those 
rights to which the licensee is entitled.279 Here, the state did not sepa-
rate the economic value of the license from the license itself by giving 
the licensee the right to utilize the economic value of its liquor license 
as collateral.280 The state did not expressly deny the ability of a debtor 
to grant a security interest in its right to receive proceeds from the sale 
of the license; the court noted, however, that mere refusal to deny does 
not equal permission where the state liquor laws do not so provide.281 
                                                                                                                      
273 See In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249; In re Kluchman, 59 B.R. at 16. 
274 232 B.R. at 310. 
275 See id. 
276 See id. at 309. 
277 Id. at 310. 
278 Id. at 309–10. 
279 Id. at 310 (“[T]he state legislature . . . may choose to redefine the nature of a liquor 
license under state law.”). 
280 In re Main St., 232 B.R. at 310. The state’s approach is thus unlike that of the FCC. 
See supra notes 87–100 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 253, 256–258 (explain-
ing that, because liquor licenses are created and defined by the state, each state is able to 
determine for itself to what extent a licensee may claim a right to receive revenue from the 
license). 
281 In re Main St., 232 B.R. at 310. 
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IV. A Debtor Should Have Rights in the Sale Revenues of an 
FCC License at the Time the License Is Acquired 
 The question of when an FCC licensee acquires the right to receive 
sale revenues from its FCC license is extremely important.282 If the 
right is not acquired until the sale is finalized, or even imminent, most 
debtors will not have rights in the collateral sufficient to create a valid 
security interest until after commencement of the bankruptcy case, 
when most sales occur.283 This outcome would have a devastating effect 
on the broadcasting industry, as any such security interest would be in-
valid under section 552(a) of the Code.284 In practice, then, lenders 
would be unable to use sale revenues from an FCC license as collateral; 
yet, broadcasters often have no other property in which to grant a secu-
rity interest.285 The inability of a lender to obtain collateral of a high 
value will result in the lender’s unwillingness to provide enough financ-
ing, or any financing at all.286 Without financing, it will be extremely 
difficult for new entities to enter the broadcasting market, as they will 
not be able to afford the expensive FCC license necessary to operate.287 
From a policy standpoint, then, it is essential that a licensee is able to 
pledge its right to receive sale revenues as collateral and have that secu-
rity interest survive bankruptcy so that the licensee can obtain the nec-
essary financing.288 
                                                                                                                     
 Beyond policy, there are important parallels between the FCC li-
censing scheme and the three scenarios involving contingent rights to 
payment analyzed above.289 The main similarity is the existence of con-
tingencies that must occur before the debtor can receive the funds at 
 
282 See In re Tracy Broad. Corp., 438 B.R. 323, 330 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2010), aff’d, 469 
B.R. 55 (D. Colo. 2011), overruled by 2012 WL 4874485 (10th Cir. 2012); supra notes 38–49, 
87–108 and accompanying text. 
283 See In re TerreStar Networks, Inc., 457 B.R. 254, 269 n.13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In 
re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. 
284 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006)(invalidating after-acquired property clauses when the 
property has not been acquired at the time the bankruptcy case is commenced); Sepinuck, 
supra note 4, at 6. 
285 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269; Montero, supra note 5. Although creditors could 
technically use sale revenues as collateral, such a security interest will be meaningless if it 
cannot survive bankruptcy due to the fact that most sales occur post-petition. See In re Ter-
reStar, 457 B.R. at 269 & n.13. 
286 See Sepinuck, supra note 4, at 6. 
287 See id. 
288 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269; Sepinuck, supra note 4, at 6. 
289 See In re Long Chevrolet, Inc., 79 B.R. 759, 765 (N.D. Ill. 1987); In re Tracy, 438 B.R. 
at 330; Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 60, at 362; Munden, supra note 252, at 1200, 
1209–10, 1220–21, 1231; supra notes 182–281 and accompanying text (analyzing the con-
texts of pension plan refunds, contingency fee payments, and liquor license sale revenues). 
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issue.290 This is the key characteristic underlying the question of when 
the debtor acquires rights; thus, situations that embody this characteris-
tic should be treated the same way.291 Although the FCC context differs 
in certain ways from each of the other analyzed industries, these differ-
ences are not determinative of when a debtor acquires the right to fu-
ture payment.292 Thus, courts faced with the issue of when a licensee’s 
right to receive revenues for the sale of its FCC license should apply the 
rationale put forth by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Ore-
gon in the 1988 case In re Northwest Acceptance Corp., which underlies the 
treatment of the analogous question in the context of pension plan re-
funds, contingency fee agreements, and liquor license sale revenues.293 
A. Comparing the Right to Receive Sale Revenues from an FCC License with 
Other Rights to Receive Future Funds 
 There are several parallels between the telecommunications indus-
try and each of the three scenarios outlined in Part III above.294 Most 
notably, all four situations involve taking a security interest in a right to 
something that may never have future value.295 If a pension plan is nev-
er terminated, then a debtor’s right to a pension plan refund is value-
                                                                                                                      
290 See In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 765 (explaining the contingencies required for 
receipt of a pension plan refund); In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330 (explaining the contingen-
cies required for receipt of FCC license sale revenues); Black’s Law Dictionary, supra 
note 60, at 362 (explaining the contingencies required for receipt of a contingency fee); 
Munden, supra note 252, at 1200, 1209–10, 1220–21, 1231 (explaining the contingencies 
required for receipt of liquor license sale revenues). 
291 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *13 (framing the issue before the court as 
“whether the licensee’s right in the sale proceeds . . . is too speculative to support attach-
ment . . . .” because of the presence of the two conditions of sale); In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 
330 (explaining that the issue of whether the debtor has rights in the collateral arises be-
cause of the existence of conditions that must be met before the license can be sold). 
292 See Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 267 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2001); In re Main St. Bever-
age Corp., 232 B.R. 303, 310 (D.N.J. 1998); In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 765; In re Nw. 
Acceptance Corp., 93 B.R. 243, 249 (Bankr. D. Or. 1988). 
293 See In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 765; In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249; In re 
Kluchman, 59 B.R. 13, 16 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985); PNC Bank v. Berg, No. 94C-09-208-WTQ, 
1997 WL 527978, at *9–10 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 1997) (unpublished opinion). 
294 See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2006); Benjamin et al., supra note 3, at 5; Boyce, supra note 
183, at 562; Munden, supra note 252, at 1199–1200; supra notes 182–281 and accompany-
ing text. For instance, both the telecommunications industry and the liquor industry are 
highly regulated markets in which an entity may not participate without a government-
issued license. See 47 U.S.C. § 301; Benjamin et al., supra note 3, at 5; Boyce, supra note 
183, at 562; Munden, supra note 252, at 1199. 
295 See In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330; In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249; PNC Bank, 1997 
WL 527978, at *9; Munden, supra note 252, at 1200, 1209–10, 1220–21, 1231. 
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less.296 If a case with a contingency fee agreement is not resolved in the 
client’s favor, then the attorney will not collect any legal fees.297 If ei-
ther (1) there is no willing buyer, or (2) the state government does not 
give permission for a transfer to occur, then there will be no sale of a 
liquor license and thus no sale revenues.298 Similarly, if the FCC license 
is not sold, but instead reverts back to the FCC after it expires, then the 
licensee will receive no value from its right to receive revenues from the 
sale of its license.299 
 finding.304 
                                                                                                                     
 Admittedly, the sale of an FCC license is not perfectly analogous to 
any of the three types of contingent rights identified above.300 None of 
the differences, however, warrant refusal to apply the In re Northwest ra-
tionale regarding pension plans to the FCC context.301 It is true that 
the In re Northwest court found that the debtor had a reversionary right 
to the pension refunds, thus making the right not contingent as a mat-
ter of law.302 It is equally true, though, that the In re Long Chevrolet court 
did not make such a finding, yet also determined that it is not a 
debtor’s right to a pension refund—but the value of the refund itself—
that is contingent.303 Although the presence of a reversionary interest 
might make the absoluteness of the right more clear, the In re Long 
Chevrolet court demonstrated that this interest is not necessary to sup-
port such a
 
296 See 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006). That right is also valueless if the liabilities equal or 
exceed the amount in the fund. See id. § 1344(d)(1). 
297 See U.S. Claims, Inc. v. Flomenhaft & Cannata, LLC, 519 F. Supp. 2d 515, 523 (E.D. 
Pa. 2007); Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 60, at 362. 
298 See Munden, supra note 252, at 1200, 1209–10, 1220–21, 1231. Again, these contin-
gencies exist only in states that have enacted laws requiring that a licensee obtain govern-
ment consent before transferring their liquor license. See supra notes 252--261 and accom-
panying text. 
299 See In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. The sale of an FCC license requires both (1) locating 
a willing buyer and (2) FCC approval of the transfer. See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at 
*6; In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. Just as in the liquor license 
scenario, this would occur if either no buyer is found or if the government denies the 
transfer request. See In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. 
300 See Cadle, 267 F.3d at 20; In re Main St., 232 B.R. at 310; In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. 
at 765; In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249. 
301 See Cadle, 267 F.3d at 20; In re Main St., 232 B.R. at 310; In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. 
at 765; In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249. See supra notes 199-–224 and accompanying text 
(describing the rationales behind the In re Long Chevrolet and the In re Northwest Acceptance 
decisions). 
302 See 93 B.R. at 249. 
303 See 79 B.R. at 765. 
304 See id. 
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 Additionally, the right to a pension refund is granted by statute, 
whereas a licensee’s right to sale revenues is not.305 This, too, is irrele-
vant for purposes of applying the In re Northwest rationale.306 The FCC 
has the authority to create the licenses and to determine what rights 
they bestow upon the holder.307 The FCC has stated that the license 
gives the holder a right to receive revenues resulting from a sale of the 
license.308 Both the pension refund and the FCC license, then, deal 
with a right that is explicitly given to the debtor.309 The authority that 
grants that explicit right should not matter, as long as the grantor has 
the appropriate power to do so.310 
 In the contingency fee context, there is one main difference that a 
court might seek to rely on in declining to extend the In re Northwest ra-
tionale to the FCC license context.311 The contingency fee cases do not 
involve a bifurcation of rights.312 The thing giving rise to the right—the 
contingency fee contract itself—is the asset in which a creditor wants to 
take a security interest.313 In the FCC license context, this would be 
analogous to taking an interest in the license itself.314 This is not what 
occurs in the FCC situation, however.315 Instead, those creditors seek to 
take an interest directly in the right to receive sale revenues that arises 
under the license.316 This difference is not relevant, however, because 
whether the security interest in the FCC context is valid depends on 
whether the debtor’s right to payment is a contingent right.317 This 
                                                                                                                      
305 See In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 765; In re O’Cheskey, 13 FCC Rcd. 986, 10,656, 
10,660 (1994). 
306 See In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249. 
307 Benjamin et al., supra note 3, at 62–63. 
308 See In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987 & n.7. 
309 See In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 765; In re O’Cheskey, 13 FCC Rcd. at 10,660. 
310 See In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 765; In re O’Cheskey, 13 FCC Rcd. at 10,660. The FCC 
has the appropriate power to grant the right because it is the creator of the license. See Ben-
jamin et al., supra note 3, at 62–63. ERISA, as a federal law, also possesses the appropriate 
power. Retirement Plans, Benefits, & Savings: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), U.S. 
Dep’t Lab., http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/erisa.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
311 See Cadle, 267 F.3d at 20; PNC Bank, 1997 WL 527978, at *10; In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC 
Rcd. at 987. 
312 See Cadle, 267 F.3d at 20; In re Holstein, Mack, & Klein, 2000 WL 343795, at *8 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000); PNC Bank, 1997 WL 527978, at *10. 
313 See Cadle, 267 F.3d at 20; In re Holstein, 2000 WL 343795, at *8; PNC Bank, 1997 WL 
527978, at *10. 
314 See In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987 & n.7. 
315 See In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 264. 
316 See id.; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. 
317 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *13 (framing the issue before the court as 
“whether the licensee’s right in the sale proceeds . . . is too speculative to support attach-
ment”); In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330. 
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analysis is also essential to the matter at issue in the contingency fee cas-
es.318 It does not matter why the issues are important in each particular 
situation; the fact that the same question—whether the debtor’s right to 
payment is a contingent right—is being answered in both situations al-
lows courts in the FCC license context to apply the same rationale as in 
the contingency fee context.319 
 Looking to the liquor license industry, one may argue that, under 
In re Main Street, courts should invalidate a security interest in a licen-
see’s right to sale revenues from its FCC license post-petition.320 Con-
sidering the In re Main Street and In re Kluchman cases together, however, 
it is clear that the holding in In re Main Street should not be applied to 
the FCC context.321 The FCC, unlike the state in In re Main Street, has 
acknowledged that a licensee’s right to receive revenues from the sale 
of its license is separable from the license itself.322 Furthermore, the 
FCC has explicitly granted licensees the ability to use this right as col-
lateral.323 Thus, the concern of the court in In re Main Street—that the 
entity responsible for creating license rights did not create the right 
that the licensee was attempting to assert—is not an issue in the FCC 
context.324 Instead, the holding of the In re Kluchman court should be 
applied; the presence of conditions that must be met before a license 
may be sold does not mean that the debtor’s right to receive proceeds 
from such a sale does not come into existence until one or more of 
those conditions occur.325 
B. Courts Should Apply the In re Northwest Rationale to the FCC  
Licensing Context 
 The key factor in the debate over when a debtor acquires the right 
to receive future funds is the uncertainty of whether the triggering 
conditions will occur.326 This key characteristic exists in all four contin-
                                                                                                                      
 
318 See U.S. Claims, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 522–23; PNC Bank, 1997 WL 527978, at *9. 
319 See U.S. Claims, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 522–23; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330; PNC Bank, 
1997 WL 527978, at *9. 
320 See 232 B.R. at 310; supra notes 274--281 and accompanying text (explaining the In 
re Main Street holding and rationale). 
321 See In re Main St., 232 B.R. at 310; In re Kluchman, 59 B.R. at 16. 
322 See In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987 & n.7. 
323 In re O’Cheskey, 13 FCC Rcd. at 10,660. 
324 See In re Main St., 232 B.R. at 310; In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987 & n.7. 
325 See In re Kluchman, 59 B.R. at 16. 
326 See In re Tracy, 2012 WL 4874485, at *13 (framing the issue before the court as 
“whether the licensee’s right in the sale proceeds . . . is too speculative to support attach-
ment”); In re TerreStar, 457 B.R. at 269 (discussing the problems with conditioning attach-
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gent right situations.327 As explained above, any differences between 
the FCC licensing context and the other three industries are insignifi-
cant for purposes of determining when the debtor acquires its right to 
receive future funds.328 The existence of this key similarity, combined 
with the absence of any significant differences, means that, logically, 
courts should treat all four situations the same.329 Thus, courts should 
apply the In re Northwest rationale that underlies the treatment of pen-
sion plan refunds, contingency fee agreements, and liquor license sale 
revenues to the FCC licensing context.330 
 Application of In re Northwest would require courts to hold that an 
FCC licensee acquires the right to receive revenue from the approved 
sale of its FCC license at the time it acquires the license; neither a sale, 
nor FCC approval of a sale, need be forthcoming.331 This result makes 
sense given the structure of the telecommunications industry and its 
reliance on outside financing.332 Additionally, such an outcome is con-
sistent with the treatment of the right to receive future funds in other 
industries.333 Finally, the In re Northwest rationale is logical when applied 
to the FCC context.334 
 The FCC has explicitly granted the debtor the right to receive the 
revenues from any sale of its FCC licensee of conveying ownership of 
the license.335 The question is what the value of those sale revenues will 
                                                                                                                      
ment on the occurrence of two events— “a sale and FCC approval”); In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 
330 (explaining that the relevant “question is: did the Debtor have sufficient ‘rights in the 
collateral’” and basing the answer to that question on the fact that the right was “subject to 
two contingencies”). 
327 See id.; In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249; PNC Bank, 1997 WL 527978, at *9; 
Munden, supra note 252, at 1200, 1209–10, 1220–21, 1231. 
328 See Cadle, 267 F.3d at 20; In re Main St., 232 B.R. at 310; In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. 
at 765; In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249. 
329 See Cadle, 267 F.3d at 20; In re Main St., 232 B.R. at 310; In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. 
at 765; In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330; In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249; PNC Bank, 1997 WL 
527978, at *9; Munden, supra note 252, at 1200, 1209–10, 1220–21, 1231. 
330 See In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 765; In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249; In re 
Kluchman, 59 B.R. at 16; PNC Bank, 1997 WL 527978, at *9–10. 
331 See In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249. 
332 See Sepinuck, supra note 4, at 6. The fact that (1) a telecommunications provider’s 
most valuable asset is its FCC license, (2) the provider and potential creditors will want to 
use that license’s sale revenues as collateral for loans, and (3) telecommunications provid-
ers rely on outside financing to participate in the market all mean that a rule rendering 
the use of the sale revenues as collateral effectively worthless would devastate the tele-
communications industry. See id.; supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text. 
333 See In re Long Chevrolet, 79 B.R. at 765; In re Kluchman, 59 B.R. at 16; PNC Bank, 1997 
WL 527978, at *9–10. 
334 See In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249. 
335 See In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987 & n.7. 
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be.336 The conditions at issue—whether there is a buyer of the license 
and whether the FCC approves the sale—determine the amount of the 
sale revenues.337 As such, it is the value of the right, not the existence of 
that right, that is contingent.338 If a buyer is found and the FCC ap-
proves the sale, the specific contract with the buyer would determine 
the amount of the sale revenues, just as the liabilities recognized by the 
PBGC determine the residual funds constituting the debtor’s pension 
plan refund.339 If there is no buyer, or the FCC denies the transfer, the 
value of the right to receive sale revenues would be zero; similarly, if a 
pension plan is not terminated or the liabilities of the plan exceed the 
amount of money in the fund, the value of the right to receive a refund 
would be zero.340 
 The distinction made in the contingency fee context between a 
tort plaintiff’s right to payment and an attorney’s right to payment illus-
trates a situation when the right itself, and not the value of the right, 
would be contingent.341 It is the tort judgment that creates the plain-
tiff’s right to payment; thus, the plaintiff does not have a right to pay-
ment until it acquires a favorable judgment.342 Similarly, the right to 
receive sale proceeds is created by the FCC license.343 To enjoy the 
rights under an FCC license, the debtor must first obtain an FCC li-
cense.344 Thus, holding that the right to payment itself is too remote 
may be appropriate when a broadcasting entity grants a security interest 
in its right to sale revenues, but has not yet obtained an FCC license.345 
In that case, the right to receive sale revenues would itself be a contin-
gent right—contingent on the acquisition of a license.346 Conversely, a 
debtor who has already acquired an FCC license is like the attorney 
who has already obtained a contingency fee contract.347 Both have a 
                                                                                                                      
336 See In re Nw. Acceptance, 93 B.R. at 249. 
337 See id. 
338 See id. 
339 See 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d) (2006); In re Tracy, 438 B.R. at 330; supra notes 195–198 and 
accompanying text. 
340 See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d). 
341 See U.S. Claims, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 523; supra notes 242--251 and accompanying text 
(explaining the difference between a tort plaintiff’s right to payment and a contractual 
right to payment). 
342 Id. at 522–23. Similar reasoning can be applied to the contingency fee situation. See 
id. It is the contingency fee contract that gives rise to the right to payment; thus, an attor-
ney must have an existing contract in order to have a right to the contingency fee. See id. 
343 See In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987 & n.7. 
344 See U.S. Claims, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 522–23; In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987 & n.7. 
345 See U.S. Claims, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 522–23. 
346 In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987 & n.7. 
347 See U.S. Claims, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 523; In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987 & n.7. 
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property interest in an item that bestows upon them a right to pay-
ment.348 The right is established by the property interest; it is the value 
of that right that depends on the occurrence of certain conditions.349 
Conclusion 
 The question of when an FCC licensee acquires the right to receive 
revenues from the sale of its license is complicated, due to the fact that 
any sale of an FCC license cannot occur until there is a contract for sale 
and approval from the FCC. The existence of contingencies in future 
rights to payment, however, is not a new phenomenon. In several in-
dustries, such a right has been found to exist upon acquisition of the 
item from which the right to payment stems—in the FCC context, this 
would be upon acquisition of the FCC license itself. Given the similari-
ties between the FCC licensing scheme and these industries, and the 
presence of only inconsequential differences, there is no reason to treat 
FCC licensing any differently. 
 Such an outcome is not only logical, but also ensures that lenders 
have sufficient collateral to finance broadcasting entities. An FCC li-
cense is often the most valuable asset a telecommunications provider 
has; as such, it is vital that a provider is able to grant a security interest 
in the sale revenues of its license in order to obtain financing from 
lenders. A rule that prevents a security interest in the sale revenues of 
an FCC license from surviving in bankruptcy effectively renders such a 
security interest worthless, and will prevent broadcasting entities from 
obtaining financing. Determining that a right to receive revenues exists 
at the moment when the telecommunications provider acquires the 
FCC license allows for continued financing of existing broadcasting 
entities and of new entities seeking to enter the telecommunications 
market. 
 Regardless of how compelling this policy rationale may be, many 
courts may refuse to reach the conclusion that these security interests 
should attach at the time they are created based on policy alone. Addi-
tionally, it is fathomable that future courts will be swayed by the reason-
ing in the original In re Tracy decision and, without a contrary legal ar-
gument, will reach the same result. Thus, it is important to find a legal 
basis for holding that a licensee’s right to receive sale revenues exists at 
the time the license is acquired, even though neither condition ulti-
mately required for sale has occurred. Looking at other rights to pay-
                                                                                                                      
348 See U.S. Claims, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 522–23; In re O’Cheskey, 9 FCC Rcd. at 987 & n.7. 
349 See U.S. Claims, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 523. 
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ment with similar contingencies—pension plan refunds, contingency 
fee payments, and liquor license sale revenues—provides the legal basis 
that many courts need. It is the value of the right to payment, and not 
the right to payment itself, that depends on the contingencies. Thus, 
the debtor’s right to receive sale revenues from an FCC license is not 
contingent, and exists at the time the item creating the right—the FCC 
license—is acquired. 
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